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performance under alternative exchange rate regimes.  We are particularly interested in 
investigating whether terms of trade disturbances have a smaller effect on growth in 
countries with a flexible exchange rate regime, than in countries with a more rigid 
exchange rate arrangement. We also analyze whether negative and positive terms of trade 
shocks have asymmetric effects on growth, and whether the magnitude of these 
asymmetries depends on the exchange rate regime. We find evidence suggesting that 
terms of trade shocks get amplified in countries that have more rigid exchange rate 
regimes. We also find evidence of an asymmetric response to terms of trade shocks: the 
output response is larger for negative than for positive shocks. Finally, we find evidence 
supporting the view that, after controlling for other factors, countries with more flexible 
exchange rate regimes grow faster than countries with fixed exchange rates. 
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I.  Introduction 
During the last few years economists’ views on exchange rate regimes have 
evolved significantly.  Fixed-but-adjustable regimes have lost adepts, while hard-pegs 
and floating rates have gained in popularity.  The discussion on the relative merits of 
these two contrasting exchange rate systems has come to be known as the “two corners” 
debate (Fischer 2001).  Supporters of hard-pegs have argued that this type of regime 
provides credibility and results in lower inflation, a more stable economic environment 
and faster economic growth.
1  Supporters of flexibility, on the other hand, have argued 
that under floating exchange rates the economy has a greater ability to adjust to external 
shocks.
2  According to this view, which at least goes back to Meade (1951), countries 
with a flexible exchange rate system will be able to buffer real shocks stemming from 
abroad.  This, in turn, will allow countries with floating rates to avoid costly and 
protracted adjustment processes.
3  
In most models of open economies, real external shocks – including terms of trade 
and real interest rate shocks – will result in changes in the equilibrium real exchange rate 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). If the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the adjustment in the 
equilibrium real exchange rate will have to take place through changes in domestic 
nominal prices and domestic wages.  As Meade (1951, p. 201-02) argued early on, this 
adjustment will be difficult in countries with a fixed exchange rate and inflexible money 
wages.  According to Meade (1951), in the presence of these rigidities the economy is 
likely to benefit from what he called a  “variable exchange rate” regime, or from what 
we know today as a floating exchange rate system.  He was careful to note, however, that 
flexible exchange rates are not a panacea, and that there are indeed circumstances when 
they may not help to accommodate external disturbances.  This would be the case, for 
                                                           
1 Hard-peg regimes include currency boards, currency unions and dollarization.  The growth effect is 
suppose to take place through two channels:  (a) dollarization will mean lower interest rates, higher 
investment and, thus, faster growth. Dornbusch, for instance, (2001, p.240) has emphasized this channel, 
arguing that dollarization-induced lower interest rates are  “conducive to investment and risk-taking, which 
translates into growth, and … a virtuous circle.” And (b), by eliminating exchange rate volatility, hard-pegs 
will encourage international trade and this, in turn, will result in faster growth.  Rose (2000), and Rose and 
Van Wincoop (2001), among others, have emphasized this trade channel within the context of currency 
unions. On analytical aspects of dollarization see Calvo (1999) and Eichengreen and Haussman (1999). 
2   In this paper we will use the terms “floating” and “flexible” exchange rate interchangeably. 
3   Friedman (1953) was an early proponent of this view.  The idea that hard pegs magnify external shocks 
acquired greater prominence in the aftermath of the Argentine currency and debt crisis of 2001-2002.   2
instance, if due to indexation or other mechanisms real wages were inflexible.
4 This key 
point has also been recognized by modern scholars that have analyzed the merits of 
alternative exchange rate regimes (Dornbusch, 2001; Kenen, 2002).  
Recently, a number of authors have argued that flexible exchange rate systems 
will not be effective in countries where the private and public sectors have large foreign 
currency-denominated liabilities (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999).  In this case, it has 
been argued, it is even possible that a flexible exchange rate regime will amplify the 
negative effects of terms of trade shocks.  The reason for this is that in the presence of 
“balance sheet” effects, the currency depreciation generated by the external shock will 
generate (large) increases in the value of the debt expressed in domestic currency.  This, 
in turn, may trigger bankruptcies, lead the public sector to insolvency, and result in a 
reduction in the rate of growth  (Calvo 2000).   
As the preceding discussion suggests, determining whether flexible exchange rate 
regimes are indeed able to insulate the economy from external shocks, and contribute to 
improving economic performance, is ultimately an empirical issue; it can only be 
elucidated by analyzing the historical evidence.
5  Surprisingly, there has been very little 
empirical work on the relationship between exchange rate regimes and the way in which 
terms of trade shocks affect growth and other measures of economic performance.  In 
fact, papers that have investigated empirically the way in which terms of trade 
disturbances affect economic growth and growth volatility, have tended to ignore the role 
of the exchange rate regime in the transmission process.  A literature search using 
EconLit indicates that 165 papers with the words “exchange rate regimes” and “growth” 
in the title or abstract were published between 1969 and 2002 (August).  During the same 
period, 98 papers with the words “terms of trade” and “growth” were published.   
However, only 3 articles that had all three terms were published during this 33-year 
span.
6  
                                                           
4 In fact, Meade (1951, p. 203) explicitly said that “for the variable-exchange-rate mechanism to work 
effectively there must be sufficient divorce in movements in the cost of living and movements in money 
wage rates.” 
5   Calvo (2000), for instance, has argued that if there are “dollarized liabilities” a flexible exchange rate 
regime may  
6   Broda (2001) is a recent contribution that analyzes whether the exchange rate regime makes a difference 
in the way in which terms of trade shocks impact economic performance.   3
The purpose of this paper is to bridge this gap in the literature, and to analyze 
empirically the effect of terms of trade shocks on economic performance under 
alternative exchange rate regimes.  We are particularly interested in investigating 
whether, as supporters of exchange rate flexibility have claimed, terms of trade 
disturbances have a smaller effect on growth in countries with a flexible exchange rate 
regime, than in countries with a more rigid exchange rate arrangement. We also analyze 
whether negative and positive terms of trade shocks have asymmetric effects on growth, 
and whether the magnitude of these asymmetries depends on the exchange rate regime.  
In order to investigate these issues we use a new data set that provides an improved 
classification of the exchange rate regime in each country at any particular moment in 
time.  The advantage of this data set – which was constructed by Levy Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2002) – is that it does not rely on official country statements for classifying 
countries as having a pegged, intermediate or floating regime.
7  Instead, this new data set 
uses actual data on the behavior of nominal exchange rates and international reserves to 
classify countries under different regimes.   
Our findings may be summarized as follows: First, we find evidence suggesting 
that terms of trade shocks get amplified in countries that have more rigid exchange rate 
regimes.  Another way of saying this is that we find evidence indicating that, with other 
things given, countries with flexible exchange rates are able to accommodate better real 
external shocks. Second, we find evidence of an asymmetric response to terms of trade 
shocks. More precisely, the output response is larger for negative than for positive 
shocks, a fact consistent with the presence of asymmetries in the price response (with 
downward nominal inflexibility leading to larger quantity adjustments). Interestingly, 
while the output response in both directions is, again, larger the more rigid the exchange 
rate, this asymmetry is also significant in more flexible regimes.
8  In addition, we find 
evidence supporting the view that, after controlling for other factors, countries with more 
                                                           
7   It is well known that in many countries the authorities systematically state that they have a particular 
regime, when in reality they have a different one.  See Edwards (1993) for a discussion on this issue.  
8 This would be in principle consistent with the presence of fear of floating, as reflected in a partial 
response of nominal exchange rates to positive shocks that result in larger real contractions. This 
hypothesis or, more generally, the hypothesis that exchange rates elasticity tends to be smaller in the event 
of negative shocks, is a fruitful topic for future research.   
   4
flexible exchange rate regimes grow faster than countries with fixed exchange rates, 
confirming previous findings in Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section II we present our 
empirical framework, we discuss our data, and we present our basic results.  In Section 
III we examine the robustness of the results to the use of the IMF de jure classification, 
and we extend the analysis to explore potential asymmetries in the output response to 
terms of trade shocks.  Finally, in Section IV we present some concluding remarks. 
 
II.  Terms of Trade Shocks, Exchange Rate Regimes and Growth:  An Empirical 
Analysis 
Economists’ concerns with the effects of terms of trade changes on economic 
growth goes back, at least, to the writings of Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950).  These 
influential authors made two claims: first, they argued that developing countries’ terms of 
trade had exhibited a secular deterioration through time.  And second, according to them 
this decline in relative exports’ prices contributed to the developing countries’ lack of 
industrialization, and resulted in low rates of growth, stagnation and further 
impoverishment.  As a result of Prebisch and Singer’s empirical propositions, a number 
of authors developed theoretical models on the connection between terms of trade and 
economic growth.   The majority of these models considered rather simple links, and 
argued that by negatively affecting real income, negative terms of trade shocks depressed 
aggregate demand and, thus, resulted in lower growth (Bloomfield 1984, Singer and Lutz 
1994).  More recent studies, however, have focused on a variety of transmission 
channels, including the effect of terms of trade on relative prices.  Barro and Sala-I-
Martin (1995), for example, have pointed out that whether growth in fact accelerates as a 
result of terms of trade improvements depends on the effects of relative price changes on 
productivity improvements.    
Some authors have emphasized the effects of terms of trade shocks on capital 
accumulation and factor intensities. Basu and McLeod (1992), for example, constructed a 
stochastic model of growth where imported intermediate inputs are complementary to 
capital.  In this setting, deterioration in the terms of trade makes imported inputs more 
expensive and has the potential of reducing capital’s productivity.  In addition, in this   5
model, uncertainty regarding the terms of trade has a negative effect on investment and, 
ultimately, on growth.  Mendoza (1997) developed a stochastic model of growth in which 
terms-of-trade uncertainty affects savings and growth. In this model terms of trade 
improvements have a positive effect on savings, capital accumulation and, thus, on the 
average rate of growth.  The model also predicts that increased terms-of-trade variability 
could result in either faster or slower growth, depending on the degree of risk aversion.   
In a comprehensive study Hadass and Williamson (2001) have reviewed most of 
the empirical literature on terms of trade and economic performance produced during the 
last five decades, including the works by Easterly et al (1993), Collier and Gunning 
(1999), Warner (1992), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) and Barro (1997).  They 
convincingly argue that, while there has been massive amount of work trying to explain 
the actual behavior of terms of trade, relatively few studies have focused on the effects of 
terms of trade shocks on growth. And none of the studies reviewed by them makes a 
distinction between countries with different exchange rate regimes. In a recent 
contribution, Broda (2001) provides one of the few empirical analyses on how terms of 
trade shocks affect real economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes.  
He uses a VARs analysis to compute the way in which terms of trade shocks affect 
growth.  He finds that the (negative) effect of a 10% deterioration in the terms of trade 
has a greater negative effect on growth under fixed than under flexible exchange rate 
regimes. 
 
II.1  The Empirical Model 
Our main interest is to investigate whether, as supporters of floating exchange 
rates have claimed, countries with floating exchange rate regimes are (partially) insulated 
from the effects of terms of trade shocks on growth.  More specifically, we are interested 
in finding out if terms of trade disturbances affect differently countries with different 
exchange rate regimes.  The point of departure of our empirical analysis is a two-equation 
formulation for the dynamics of real GDP per capita growth of country j in period t. 
Equation (1) is the long run GDP growth equation, while equation (2) captures the 
growth dynamics process. 
   6
(1) g* j =  α + x j β + r j θ  + ω j. 
 
(2)  ∆ g t j =  λ [ g* j – g t-1  j ] + ϕ v t j + γ u t j + ξ t j .    
 
The following notation has been used: g* j is the long run rate of real per capita GDP 
growth in country j. x  j is a vector of structural, institutional and policy variables that 
determine long run growth; r  j is a vector of regional dummies. α,  β and θ are 
parameters, and ω j is an error term assumed to be heteroskedastic. In equation (2), g t j is 
the rate of growth of per capita GDP in country j in period t. The terms v t j and u t j are 
shocks, assumed to have zero mean, finite variance and to be uncorrelated among 
themselves. More specifically, v t j is assumed to be an external terms of trade shock, 
while u t j captures other shocks, including political shocks. ξ t j is an error term, which is 
assumed to be heteroskedastic – see equation (3) below for details. λ, ϕ, and  γ are 
parameters that determine the particular characteristics of the growth process.  
From the perspective of the exchange rate regime discussion, an important 
question is whether the exchange rate system has a direct effect on the long-term rate of 
growth. We deal with this issue by investigating whether in equation (1) the intercept α is 
different for countries with different exchange rate regimes.
9  Equation (2) -- which has 
the form of an equilibrium correction model (ECM) --, states that the actual rate of 
growth in period t will deviate from the long run rate of growth due to the existence of 
three types of shocks: v t j, u t j and ξ t j.  Over time, however, the actual rate of growth will 
tend to converge towards it long run value, with the rate of convergence given by λ. 
Parameter ϕ, in equation (2), is expected to be positive, indicating that an improvement in 
the terms of trade will result in a (temporary) acceleration in the rate of growth, and that 
negative terms of trade shock are expected to have a negative effect on g t  j.  
Our main interest is to determine whether parameter ϕ in equation (3) depends on 
the exchange rate regime of the country in question.  If, as their supporters have argued, 
floating exchange rates allow countries to absorb foreign shocks better, we would expect 
ϕ to be smaller in countries with floating rates than in those countries with some version   7
of a pegged rates exchange rate regime.  We are also interested in determining whether 
positive and negative terms of trade shocks have asymmetric effects on growth – that we 
do in section III.  Our task, then, is to estimate the system given by equations (1) and (2), 
and to analyze if the coefficients α and ϕ are different across exchange rate regimes.  The 
estimation of this system is not trivial, and is subject to the complexities of estimating 
panels with lagged dependent variables and heteroskedastic errors.   
We estimate the system (1) - (2) using a two-step procedure. In the first step we 
estimate the long run growth equation (2) using a cross-country data set.  These data are 
averages for 1974-2000, and the estimation makes a correction for heteroskedasticity. 
These first stage estimates are then used to generate long run predicted rates of growth to 
replace g*j in the equilibrium correction model (2).  In the second step, we estimate 
equation (2) using a feasible generalized least squares procedure (FGLS) suggested by 
Beck and Katz (1995) for unbalanced panels.
 In the estimation of equation (2) the error ξ t 
j is assumed to be heteroskedastic, with a different variance for each of the k panels.   
 
 
        σ
2
1 I         0       …      0   
           0          σ
2
2 I     …      0   
(3)   E  [ξξ ’ ] =           .              .           .        .   
           .              .           .        .   
            0             0        …   σ
2
k I  
  
 
The FGLS estimator has the same properties as the GLS estimator, and is 
asymptotically efficient. Notice that an alternative estimation strategy would be to re-
parameterize equation (1) and (2), and to apply the Generalized-Method-of-Moments 
(GMM) for dynamic panel data models suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). When 
we did this, the results obtained were similar to those obtained using our two-steps-FLS 
methodology.
10   
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 On debates on the effect of alternative exchange rate regimes on performance see, for example, Gosh et al 
(1995), Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002), Frankel (1999) and Kenen (2002). 
10 A potential limitation of the GMM strategy, however, is it does not lend itself to a straight forward 
interpretation of the equilibrium correction term. The results we obtained when using this method are 
available on request. 
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We use two alternative methods to investigate whether the terms of trade 
coefficient ϕ in equation (2) is different for different exchange rate regimes: The first one 
consists of including a variable that interacts the terms of trade shock with three 
alternative indicators for exchange rate regimes.  Our second method consists of splitting 
the sample according to the exchange rate regime, and comparing the estimated 
coefficients for the terms of trade variable.  If flexible regimes buffer the country better 
form external disturbances, we would expect the coefficient for the terms of trade 
variable to be significantly lower in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes than in 
countries with rigid regimes. 
 
II.2  Data and Equation Specification 
Our sample covers annual observations for 183 countries over the period 1974-
2000. With the exception of the civil unrest, exchange rate regimes, and secondary school 
enrollment variables, the data were obtained from the IMF and the World Bank 
databases. Since data availability varies across countries and periods, all tests were run on 
consistent subsamples of observations corresponding to 96 and 100 countries. A list of 
countries, as well as the definitions and sources for the variables used, are reported in 
Appendix A.  
As pointed out above, our main interest is to analyze the transmission of terms of 
trade shocks under alternative exchange rate regimes. There is generalized agreement, 
however, that the IMF’s “official” exchange rate regime classification tends to be 
misleading.  For this reason, we use a methodology proposed by Levy Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2001) to construct four indexes of exchange rate regimes.  These indexes 
are constructed as time series, and are based on actual, as opposed to legal, exchange rate 
behavior– see Appendix B for details.  The three indexes are defined as follows:  
• 
• 
A binary index that takes the value of one if in that particular year the country 
has a pegged exchange rate regime, and zero otherwise.  We call this index 
pegged.   
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if in that particular year if the 
country in question has a hard (as opposed to a conventional) peg – that is, if   9
it has a currency board, belongs to a currency union or it is dollarized. The 
index takes a value of zero otherwise.  This variable is called hard.  
• 
• 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the exchange rate regime is an 
intermediate regime – crawling pegs, managed floats, and the like (see Levy 
Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2001, for details).  We call this index intermediate.  
Notice that from these definitions we are able to construct an index that takes 
the value of one if the regime is neither pegged nor intermediate.  This index 
is called flexible. 
And a three-way classification that combines some of the indexes described 
above, and distinguishes between pegged, intermediate and flexible exchange 
rate regimes.  This index is called regime and takes a value of zero if in that 
particular year the country in question has a flexible rate.  It takes a value of 
one if the country has an intermediate regime, and a value of two if the 
country has a pegged exchange rate in that particular year.   
 
These indexes where constructed for each year in the sample (1974-2000).  Table 1 
presents a summary of the distribution of countries in our sample across the different 
exchange rate regimes that we have defined. 
 
[TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
In estimating equation (1) for long run per capita growth, we follow the by now 
standard literature on growth, as summarized by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), and use 
average data for 1974-2000.  In terms of the equation specification, we follow Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin (1995), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Dollar (1992) among others, and 
assume that the rate of growth of GDP (g
*
j ) depends on a number of structural, policy 
and social variables.  More specifically, we include the following covariates: the log of 
initial GDP per capita (gdpin); the investment ratio (invgdp); the coverage of secondary 
education (sec, a proxy for human capital); an index of the degree of openness of the 
economy (openness); the ratio of government consumption relative to GDP (gov); and 
regional dummies for Latin American, Sub Saharan African and Transition economies   10
(latam, safrica, and trans). In some specifications we also included the rate of growth of 
population. Finally, and in order to investigate whether the exchange rate regime affects 
long run growth, in some of the cross-section regressions we also incorporated two 
alternative indexes for the exchange rate regime.  The first one, which we call 
pegged_cross, is a cross section version of the time series index pegged, defined above.  
It takes the value of one if the country in question has been classified as a fixed exchange 
rate regime for at least 50% of the time, and zero otherwise. The second index – called 
regime_cross – is a cross section version of the index regime described above, and is 
constructed as an average of that index. A lower value of this regime_cross index, then, 
represents a more flexible exchange rate regime.  A full description of the data, including 
the data sources, is provided in Appendix A. 
In the estimation of dynamics of growth equation (2 ), v t j is the terms of trade 
shock (∆tt), and is defined as the percentage change of the relative price of exports to 
imports.  Thus, a positive (negative) number represents an improvement (deterioration) in 
the terms of trade.  In addition to the terms of trade shocks, we also included the terms of 
trade shock interacted with our different exchange rate regime indexes. An index of civil 
unrest was included as a proxy for other shocks (this can be interpreted as being an 
element in vector u t j in equation (1)).  In all equations we included time fixed effects, 
which capture systemic shock to all countries, such as changes in global liquidity and 
shocks to world interest rates. We also included regional dummies, and in some of the 
equations we included lagged values of the terms of trade shocks.  In Table 2 we present 




[TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
II.3  Main Results 
  The results from the first step estimation for the long run growth equation are 
reported in Table 3, where the t-statistics have been estimated using robust standard 
                                                           
11 As usual, data availability differs across countries and variables. For consistency, the statistics reported in 
the table are based on the actual sample used in the empirical tests below.    11
errors computed using the Huber-White methodology. As may be seen, the results are 
quite satisfactory; all the coefficients have the expected sign and most of them are 
statistically significant.  These results confirm previous findings with respect to the roles 
played by initial GDP, education, openness, and government consumption in explaining 
differentials in long run GDP per capita across countries.  In terms of the main question 
raised in this paper, a particularly interesting finding in Table 3 is that the estimated 
coefficients for our two exchange rate regime indicators are significantly negative.  This 
suggests that in the long run, and after controlling for traditional covariates, countries 
with (de facto) more rigid exchange rate regimes have tended to grow at a slower rate 
than countries with more flexible exchange rate systems.  Moreover the absolute values 
of the point estimates are quite large, suggesting that, with other things given, countries 
with a fixed exchange rate regime have had a lower rate of growth of GDP per capita 
ranging between 0.66 and 0.85 percentage point per year, than countries with a flexible 
regime.  These findings contrast with studies such as Gosh et al (1995) and IMF (1997) 
that have used the official IMF classification of regimes. According to these studies, 
while fixed exchange rate countries tend to have a lower rate of inflation than flexible 
rate ones, there is no statistical difference in terms of GDP per capita growth across both 
groups of countries.  Our results, on the other hand, are consistent with recent findings by 
Levy Yeyati and Stuzenegger (2003). 
 
[TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
We use the fitted values from the estimates for long run GDP per capita growth 
reported in equation (i) in Table 2 to construct a proxy for g
*
j in the second step 
estimation of equation (2).  When alternative specifications for the long run growth 
equation were used, the results were very similar to those reported in the paper.
12 
Table 4.a contains the results from the estimation, using the FGLS procedure 
described above, of several versions of equation (2) on the dynamics of growth.  All 
equations were estimated for the 1974 – 2000 period, and included yearly fixed effects; 
this allows us to capture the effects of shocks that are systemic to all countries in a 
                                                           
12   They are available from the authors on request.   12
particular year, such as changes in international interest rates.  As may be seen the results 
are quite satisfactory.  The estimated coefficient of [ g
*
 j – g t-1  j ] is, as expected, positive, 
significant, and smaller than one.  The point estimates are on the high side  -- between 
0.75 and 0.79 --, suggesting that, on average, deviations between long run and actual 
growth get eliminated rather quickly.  For instance, according to equation (i) in Table 4.a, 
after 4 years approximately 90% of a unitary shock to real GDP growth will be 
eliminated.  Also, as expected, the estimated coefficients of the terms of trade shock are 
always positive, and statistically significant, indicating that an improvement 
(deterioration) in the terms of trade results in an acceleration (de-acceleration) in the rate 
of growth of real per capita GDP.  The results in Table 4.a also show that the coefficients 
of our political shocks variable – civil unrest – are negative in every specification.   
However, they are not significant at conventional levels. 
Our main interest in this paper is the estimated coefficient of the interactive terms 
between our exchange rate regime indexes and the terms of trade shock.  As may be seen 
from Table 4, the estimated coefficients of these interactive terms are always positive, 
and in most regressions they are significant at conventional levels.  This indicates that the 
effects of terms of trade shocks on growth are larger under fixed exchange rate regimes 
that under floating regimes.  Consider, as an example, the case of equation (i) in Table 
4.a: As may be seen the terms of trade coefficient has a point estimate of 0.043; the 
estimated interactive term, on the other hand, has a point estimate of 0.037.  These results 
suggest, then, that in pegged exchange rates countries a 10% deterioration in the 
international terms of trade has been associated, on average, with a (contemporaneous) 
decline in GDP per capita growth of 0.80 of one percentage point.  In flexible exchange 
rates countries, on the other hand, the same 10% decline in the international terms of 
trade has been associated on average with a (contemporaneous) reduction in GDP per 
capita growth of 0.43 of one percentage point.  That is, according to this equation under 
flexible exchange rates the effects of terms of trade shocks on growth are approximately 
one half than under pegged regimes.   
 
[TABLES 4.a THROUGH 4.c APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
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Table 4.b contains separate FGLS regression results for four groups, each 
corresponding to a different exchange rate regime. The first one is comprised of countries 
that according to our indicator have a flexible exchange rate; the second sub-sample 
contains countries with an intermediate regime. The third sub-sample contains countries 
with a pegged exchange rate regime.  And finally, the fourth sub-sample corresponds to 
countries that according to our classification have had a hard peg regime.  As may be 
seen, the results indicate that the estimated coefficient of the terms of trade variables is 
always positive and significant.  What is particularly interesting from the point of view of 
this paper’s topic is that point estimates of these coefficients are different across the four 
sub-samples, and that they increase with the rigidity of the exchange rate regime.  Indeed, 
the sum of the contemporaneous and lagged terms of trade coefficients is highest for the 
hard-peg regimes (0.168); the second highest value corresponds to the pegged regimes 
(0.129).  The sum of these coefficients is 0.071 for the intermediate systems, and it is the 
lowest (0.057) for the group of countries that has had a flexible exchange rate system.  
Moreover, as the χ
2 tests reported in Table 4.c indicate, the coefficients for pegs are 
significantly larger (from a statistical point of view) than those for each of the more 
flexible regimes.
13 
In order to investigate further how of terms of trade shocks affect growth under 
alternative regimes, we divided our sample into industrial and emerging countries.  This 
allows us to analyze whether the results reported above are driven by the level of 
development, rather than by their exchange rate regime.  The results obtained – which are 
reported in Table 5 –, show that flexible exchange rate regimes have helped buffer terms 
of trade shocks for both industrial and emerging nations.  
 
[TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
The results reported in Tables 4 and 5, then, provide support the hypothesis that 
countries with flexible regimes have been able to accommodate terms of trade shocks 
                                                           
13 The χ
2 statistics in this table were computed interacting each of the regressors with the corresponding 
regime dummy. Thus, for example, to compute the statistics for the pegged – flexible comparison we 
restricted the sample to include pegs and flexible regimes, interacted all controls with the pegged and   14
better than countries with rigid exchange rates.   In the next section we expand our 
analysis by investigating whether terms of trade shocks affect growth asymmetrically. 
More precisely, we examine whether the impact of negative shocks is stronger than that 
of positive shocks, as one should expect if nominal prices are rigid downward.  
 
III.  Asymmetric Effects and Robustness Analysis 
In this section we deal with two extensions: First, we investigate whether positive 
and negative terms of trade shocks affect growth in an asymmetric way, and whether 
these asymmetric effects are different under alternative exchange rate regimes.  And 
second, we analyze the robustness of our results to alternative classifications of exchange 
rate regimes, and to the use of alternative samples. 
 
III.1 Asymmetric Effects of Terms of Trade Shocks under Alternative Regimes  
It is possible to argue that from a policy point of view what really matters is the 
way in which alternative exchange rate regimes accommodate negative terms of trade 
shocks.  According to a number of authors the most important advantage of flexibility is 
that it allows the economy to buffer negative terms of trade shocks through smooth 
changes (depreciations) in the real exchange rate.  This contrasts with the case of pegged 
exchange rates, where real exchange rate depreciation requires a decline in nominal 
prices.  If nominal prices are rigid downward, however, a negative terms of trade shock 
will result in unemployment, a decline in output and I the rate of growth – see Dornbusch 
(2001) and Kenen (2002) for details. 
In order to investigate this issue, we estimated a number of regressions that 
distinguished between positive and negative terms of trade shocks.  As before we used a 
FGLS procedure for heteroskedastic panels.  In this case, our system becomes: 
 
(3) g* j =  α + x j β + r j θ  + ω j. 
 
(4)  ∆ g t j =  λ [ g* j – g t-1  j ] + ϕ vp t j + ψ vn t j  + γ u t j + ξ t j .    
                                                                                                                                                                             
flexible dummies, and tested the null ∆tt* pegged+∆tt_1*neg*pegged – (∆tt*flexible + ∆tt_1*flexible) = 0. 
The last column (pegged vs. hard) compares conventional and hard pegs regimes.   15
Where vp t j refers to positive terms of trade shocks, vn t j refers to negative shocks;  ϕ and 
ψ are coefficients to be estimated.  If the effects of negative terms of trade disturbances 
on growth are indeed larger than those of positive shocks, we would expect ϕ to be 
significantly smaller than ψ.  In the estimation of equations (3) and (4) we made a 
distinction between four exchange rate regimes:  hard-pegged; pegged; intermediate and 
flexible. If, as its supporters have argued, flexible regimes are able to accommodate better 
negative real shocks from abroad, the estimated ψs – that is, the coefficients of the 
negative terms of trade shocks  -- would be larger in countries with more rigid exchange 
rate regimes than in countries with more flexible ones.  As before, in the estimation of the 
equation on growth dynamics (equation (4)) we included time specific effects. 
The results from the estimation of the second stage equation (4) are presented in 
Table 6 for two alternative samples: one that includes all countries and a sub-sample of 
emerging countries only. As may be seen, the results obtained indicate that there are 
indeed asymmetric effects of terms of trade shocks in six out of the seven regressions.   In 
every equation, with the exception of (i) --, the sum of the coefficients for the negative 
shocks is higher that the sum of the coefficients for the positive shocks.  Moreover, the 
differences in the terms of trade coefficients are statistically significant for the hard pegs, 
pegs, and intermediate regimes – see table 7 for formal tests. 
 
[TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
[TABLE 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
Consider, for example, the comparison between pegged vs. flexible regimes for 
the whole sample.  According to the FGLS estimates in Table 6, the sum of the 
coefficients of the negative terms of trade shocks is 0.158 for the pegged regime 
countries, but only 0.053 for those countries with a flexible exchange rate.  From a 
statistical point of view, the sum of the (negative) terms of trade coefficients is 
significantly higher for the pegged regime countries – the χ
2 has a p-value of 0.017 
(Table 7).
14  In fact, similar tests indicate that the sum of the negative terms of trade 
                                                           
14 The χ
2 statistics in this table were computed interacting each of the regressors with the corresponding 
regime dummy. Thus, to compute the statistics for negative shocks for the pegged – flex comparison we   16
coefficients for countries with flexible (fixed) exchange rate arrangements are 
significantly lower (higher) than the sum of the coefficients for countries with non-
flexible (non-pegged) rates.  Thus, these results indicate that the reported asymmetric 
response to shocks in countries with more rigid exchange rate regimes is mainly driven 
by the larger effects of negative terms of trade shocks. This, combined with the fact that 
the sensitivity to both positive and negative shocks is higher the less flexible the regime, 
suggests that the lack of exchange rate flexibility increases the real impact of terms of 
trade shocks due to (particularly downward) price flexibility.  
To summarize, these results provide further support for the hypothesis that 
flexible exchange rates have played a role as shock absorbers, helping countries 
accommodate real terms of trade shocks.  This ability to accommodate these shocks 
appears to have been particularly important in the presence of negative external shocks. 
 
III.2 Alternative Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes  
  In this subsection we investigate whether the results reported above depend on the 
classification of exchange rate regimes that we have used.  In order to do this we re-
estimated our model using the standard and official exchange rate classification provided 
by the IMF.  The results obtained in this case, not reported here due to space 
considerations, are somewhat weaker.
15  Although the coefficients have the expected 
signs, and in most cases have similar point estimates to those reported in Tables 4-6, they 
are estimated with a lower degree of precision.   
To explore further this issue we conduct the following simple exercise. We revise 
the IMF-based classification, and try to detect obvious misclassifications of regimes.     
We then re-estimated our equations using a restricted sample that include only 
uncontroversial de jure IMF-defined regimes.  This entails the (relatively minor) loss of 
89 observations, which on the other hand only contribute to reduce the estimation 
precision.
16  The estimates, which are available from the authors on request, have a 
higher degree of precision than those obtained when the unadjusted IMF classification is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
included pegs and flexible regimes, interacted all the controls with the pegged and flexible dummies, and 
tested the null ∆tt*neg*pegged+∆tt*neg_1*pegged – (∆tt*neg*flexible + ∆tt*neg_1*flexible) = 0. 
15   These results are available on request.   17
used.  As before, these results indicate that terms of trade shocks – and in particular 
negative terms of trade shocks – have a larger effect on growth under rigid exchange rate 
regimes than under more flexible regimes. 
 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we examined two aspects of the economic implications of exchange 
rate regimes that, despite being recurrently used to argue in favor of exchange rate 
flexibility, had been the subject of little, if any, empirical work: i) the role played by 
flexible exchange rates as absorbers of real shocks, and ii) the link between this role and 
the presence of downward price rigidities. More precisely, we tested whether the 
sensitivity of real growth to terms of trade shocks declines as the degree of flexibility of 
the regime increases.  In addition, we investigated whether this sensitivity is higher in the 
event of negative shocks, as it would be the case in the presence of asymmetric price 
rigidities. 
Using a de facto classification of exchange rate regimes, we found that flexible 
exchange rate arrangements indeed help reduce the real impact of terms of trade shocks, 
both in emerging and industrial economies.
17 Moreover, we found real output to be more 
sensitive to negative than to positive shocks. In fact, most of the differential shock 
responses across regimes can be traced to the stronger real impact of negative shocks 
under a peg, be it of the conventional or the hard kind. The effects unveiled in this paper 
are, on the other hand, not only statistically significant but economically important: while 
a 10 percent deterioration of the terms of trade translates into a real contraction of around 
0.4% for the average country, this effect nearly doubles under a peg. Thus, the choice of 
exchange rate regime indeed has important implications in terms of output volatility.  
Moreover, the fact that the asymmetry of output responses to real shocks increases with 
the rigidity of the regime suggests that pegs are associated with deeper and longer 
contractions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 While a similar correction can be done for floats and intermediates, it is certainly in the fix group where 
misclassifications are less debatable, as changes in the exchange rate are readily observable. 
17 Similar, albeit slightly weaker, results are obtained if a de jure regime classification is used.   18
References: 
 
Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991, Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations, Review of Economic Studies, 
58, 277-297.  
 
Barro, R. J., 1997, Determinants of Economic Growth, Cambridge, Massachussets, MIT 
Press.  
 
Barro, R., Sala-I-Martin, X.,1995,  Economic Growth, McGraw Hill. 
 
Basu, P., McLeod, D., 1992, Terms of Trade, and Economic Fluctuations in Developing 
Countries, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 37, pp. 89–110. 
 
Beck, N., Katz, J., 1995, What to Do (and not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section 
Data, American Political Science Review. 
 
Bloomfield, A., 1984, Effect of Growth on the Terms of Trade: Some Earlier Views, 
Essays in the history of international trade theory, Aldershot, UK. 
 
Broda, C., 2001, Coping with Terms of Trade Shocks: Pegs vs Floats,  American 
Economic Review, 91(2), pp. 376-380. 
 
Calvo, G. A., 1999, Fixed vs. Flexible Exchange Rates. Preliminaries of a Turn-of-
Millennium Rematch, University of Maryland. Mimeo. 
 
Calvo, G., 2000, The Case for Hard Pegs in the Brave New World of Global Finance, 
Mimeo,  University of Maryland. 
 
Collier, P., Gunning, J.W., 1999, Why Has Africa Grown Slowly?, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 13:3-22. 
 
Dollar, D., 1992, Exploiting the Advantages of  Backwardness: The Importance of  
Education and Outward Orientation, Mimeo, World Bank. 
 
Dornbusch, R., 1980, Stabilization Policy in the Open Economy, Joint Economic 
Committee, Special Study on Economic Change, Washington D.C.. 
 
Dornbusch, R., 2001, Fewer Monies Better Monies, Discussion on Exchange Rates and 
the Choice of Monetary-Policy Regimes, The American Economic Review, ppg 238-242. 
 
Easterly, W., Kremer, M., Pritchett, L., Summers, L.H., 1993, Good Policy or Good 
Luck? Country Growth Performance and Temporary Shocks, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 32:459-83. 
   19
Edwards, S., 1993, Openness, Trade Liberalization, and Growth in Developing 
Countries,  Journal of Economic Literature, 1358-1393. 
 
Eichengreen, B., Haussman, R., 1999, Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility, NBER 
Working Paper No. 7418. 
 
Fischer, S., 2001, Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?, Distinguished 
Lecture on Economics in Government, AEA Meetings, New Orleans. 
 
Frankel, J., 1999, No single Currency Regime is Right for all Countries or at all Times, 
NBER Working Paper No. 7338. 
 
Friedman, M., 1953, The Case For Flexible Exchange Rates, in Essays in Positive 
Economics, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Ghosh, A., Gulde, A., Ostry J. and Wolf H., 1995,  Does the Nominal 
Exchange Rate Matter?, IMF Working Paper 95/121. 
 
Hadass, Y., Williamson, J., 2001, Terms of Trade and Economic Performance 1870-
1940: Prebisch and Singer Revisited,  NBER WP 8188.  
 
IMF, 1997, Exchange Rate Arrangements and Economic Performance in Developing 
Countries, Ch. 4 of World Economic Outlook, October. 
 
Kenen, P., 2002, Currencies, Crises, and Crashes, Mimeo. 
 
Levy Yeyati, E., Sturzenegger, F., 2002, Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes: 
Deeds vs. Words, Mimeo. 
 
Levy Yeyati, E., Sturzenegger, F., 2003, To Float or to Fix: Evidence on the Impact of 
Exchange Rate Regimes on Growth, American Economic Review, forthcoming. 
 
Lutz, M., Singer, H.W., 1994, Trend and Volatility in the Terms of Trade: Consequences 
for Growth,  The Economics of Primary Commodities: Models, Analysis and Policy, W. 
Morgan and D. Sapsford, pp. 91-121.  
 
Meade, J., 1951, The Theory of International Economic Policy, 2 volumes. 
 
Mendoza, E., 1997, Terms-of-Trade Uncertainty and Economic Growth, Journal of 
Development Economics. 
 
Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., 1995, The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates, Journal of 
Economics Perspectives, Fall. 
 
Prebisch, R., 1950, The Economic Development of Latin American and Its Principal 
Problems , New York, reprinted in Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 7 (1962):1-22.   20
 
Rose, A., 2000, One Money, One Market: Estimating The Effect of Common Currencies 
on Trade, Economic Policy. 
 
Rose, A., Van Wincoop, E., 2001, National Money as a Barrier to International Trade: 
The Real Case for Currency Union, American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, 91:2, 386-390.  
 
Sachs, J.D., Warner, A.M.,1995,  Economic Reform and the Process of Global 
Integration, Briookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: pp. 1-118. 
 
Singer, H.W., 1950, Gains and Losses from Trade and Investment in Under- Developed 
Countries, AER. 
 
Warner, A. M., 1992, Did the Debt Crisis Cause the Investment Crisis, Quarterly Journal 











Conventional Hard  Total  Intermediate  Flexible  Total  Total 
1356 717  2073  600  662  1262  3335 







Table 2.  Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Obs. Mean  Std.  dev.  Min  Max 
∆gdp  100  1.157 1.933 -5.689 5.850 
gdpin  100  1.340 1.690 0.066 9.828 
invgdp  100  0.217 0.054 0.097 0.440 
sec  100  0.416 0.275 0.020 0.910 
openness  100  0.355 0.204 0.083 1.168 
gov  100  0.203 0.192 0.024 1.148 
civil unrest  1733  3.494 1.745  1  7 
∆tt  1733  4.226 16.185  -88.846  114.195 





Table 3. Cross-Section First-Stage Growth Regressions 
 
  (i) (ii)  (iii) 
gdpin  -0.550*** -0.467**  -0.494** 
  (0.135) (0.204)  (0.197) 
invgdp  6.276 5.171  5.052 
  (4.288) (4.259)  (4.427) 
sec  2.969*** 2.591**  2.594** 
  (0.908) (1.138)  (1.105) 
openness  0.479 1.351  1.531 
  (0.970) (1.048)  (1.098) 
gov  -2.030 -2.520  -2.234 
  (1.460) (1.550)  (1.514) 
latam  -0.971** -0.828*  -0.858* 
  (0.467) (0.461)  (0.471) 
safrica  -1.480*** -1.191**  -1.280** 
  (0.547) (0.566)  (0.554) 
trans  -0.865** -0.557  -0.621 
  (0.412) (0.615)  (0.593) 
pegged_cross   -0.854***   
   (0.318)   
regime_cross     -0.656** 
     (0.278) 
constant  0.157 0.588  0.923 
  (0.950) (0.912)  (1.001) 
Obs.  100 96  96 
R
2  0.45 0.45  0.44 
 
Note: ***, **, and *  represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
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Table 4.a. Growth Dynamics Regressions (FGLS) 
Full Sample 
 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
[ g
*
 j – g t-1  j ]  0.793***  0.751***  0.793***  0.803*** 0.791*** 0.748*** 
   (0.020) (0.023)  (0.02)  (0.023)  (0.02)  (0.023) 
∆tt  0.043***  0.051***  0.058***  0.060*** 0.037*** 0.045*** 
   (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) 
∆tt_1   0.026***   0.036***    0.021* 
    (0.009)   (0.007)    (0.011) 
∆tt*pegged  0.037***  0.037***       
   (0.011)  (0.011)       
∆tt*pegged_1    0.018*       
     (0.011)       
∆tt*hard     0.03  0.043**     
      (0.018)  (0.018)     
∆tt*hard_1      0.014     
       (0.018)     
∆tt*regime        0.019***  0.020*** 
         (0.007)  (0.007) 
∆tt*regime_1          0.011* 
           (0.007) 
civil unrest  -0.029 -0.018 -0.028  -0.02  -0.034  -0.026 
   (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
constant  -0.182 -1.158** -0.216  -1.165** -0.142 -1.140** 
   (0.488)  (0.459)  (0.495)  (0.472) (0.490) (0.459) 
Obs.  1733  1650  1733  1723 1733 1650 
∆tt + ∆tt_1    0.077***    0.096***  0.066*** 
   [47.90]   [111.62]    [22.93] 
Pegged 
a    0.055***       
    [15.23]       
Hard 
b      0.057*     
      [5.58]     
Regime 
c          0.031*** 
          [13.35] 
 
Note: ***, **, and *  represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. 
χ2 in brackets. All regressions include year dummies. 
a Refers to: ∆tt*pegged + ∆tt*pegged_1. 
b Refers to: ∆tt*hard + ∆tt*hard_1. 











Table 4.b. Growth Dynamics Regressions (FGLS) 













 j – g t-1  j ]  0.882*** 0.938*** 0.767***  0.909*** 
   (0.035) (0.035) (0.030)  (0.066) 
∆tt  0.037*** 0.048*** 0.083***  0.125*** 
   (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)  (0.020) 
∆tt_1  0.020* 0.023**  0.046*** 0.043** 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)  (0.020) 
civil unrest  0.084 -0.116 -0.02  -0.108 
   (0.060) (0.082) (0.052)  (0.251) 
constant  -1.236** 2.109  0.001  1.494 
   (0.603) (1.567) (0.386)  (2.126) 
Obs.  462 416 845  225 
∆tt + ∆tt_1  0.057*** 0.071*** 0.129***  0.168*** 
  [17.76] [25.06]  [134.28] [39.68] 
 
Note: ***, **, and *  represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 




















Obs. 1307  1261  845 
Notes: ***, **, and *  represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. χ2 in brackets. All regressions include 
year dummies. 
a Refers to: ∆tt*pegged + ∆tt_1*pegged – (∆tt*flexible + ∆tt_1*flexible). 
b Refers to: ∆tt*pegged + ∆tt_1*pegged – (∆tt*intermediate + ∆tt_1*intermediate). 
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Table 5. Growth Dynamics Regressions (FGLS)   
Emerging and Industrial Countries 
 










 j – g t-1  j ]  0.789*** 0.639*** 0.787*** 0.638*** 
   (0.027) (0.045) (0.027) (0.045) 
∆tt  0.049*** 0.057*** 0.036*** 0.071*** 
   (0.010) (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) 
∆tt_1  0.025*** 0.012  0.024*  -0.006 
   (0.010) (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) 
∆tt*pegged  0.046*** -0.013     
   (0.012) (0.027)     
∆tt*pegged_1  0.016 0.068**     
   (0.012) (0.027)     
∆tt*regime     0.028***  -0.018 
      (0.008)  (0.014) 
∆tt*regime_1     0.008  0.049*** 
      (0.008)  (0.014) 
civil unrest  -0.122* -0.338** -0.125* -0.348** 
   (0.064) (0.144) (0.064) (0.142) 
constant  -0.141 -2.171*** 0.533  0.352 
   (0.512) (0.450) (0.559) (0.437) 
Obs.  1281 369 1281 369 
∆tt + ∆tt_1  0.074***  0.069*** 0.060*** 0.065*** 
  [33.24] [10.27] [12.09] [12.59] 
Pegged 
a  0.062*** 0.055**     
  [15.64] [7.31]     
Regime 
b     0.036***  0.031*** 
     [13.62]  [13.09] 
Note: ***, **, and *  represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors in parentheses. χ2 in brackets. All regressions include year dummies. 
a Refers to: ∆tt*pegged + ∆tt*pegged_1. 
La b Refers to: ∆tt*regime+∆tt*regime_1. 
 








Table 6.  Asymmetry (FGLS) 
Full Sample and Emerging Countries 
 
  (i) (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) (vi)  (vii) 
  All Emerging 
  Flexible Intermediate  Peg  Hard  Flexible  Intermediate  Peg 
[ g
*
 j – g t-1  j ]  0.883*** 0.916***  0.767***  0.907***  0.926***  0.974*** 0.803*** 
  (0.035)  (0.037) (0.030)  (0.067) (0.039)  (0.043)  (0.033) 
∆tt*pos  0.022 0.029**  0.066***  0.070*  0.032*  0.031*  0.062*** 
  (0.014)  (0.015) (0.013)  (0.037) (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.015) 
∆tt*pos_1  0.041*** 0.004  0.040***  0.046  0.027*  -0.006 0.029** 
  (0.014)  (0.015) (0.012)  (0.033) (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.013) 
∆tt_neg  0.060** 0.067***  0.105***  0.173***  0.065**  0.079*** 0.119*** 
  (0.024)  (0.022) (0.015)  (0.032) (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.016) 
∆tt*neg_1  -0.007 0.047**  0.053***  0.031  0.013  0.059***  0.055*** 
  (0.017)  (0.020) (0.016)  (0.035) (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.016) 
civil unrest  0.095  -0.024 0.020  -0.061 0.084  -0.092 -0.124 
   (0.065)  (0.087) (0.059)  (0.249) (0.119)  (0.128)  (0.084) 
constant  -1.352** 2.103  0.202 1.777  -1.791  1.579  1.267 
   (0.577)  (1.593) (0.398)  (2.151) (1.156)  (2.001)  (0.826) 
Obs.  462  416 845  225 301  326  714 
pos 
b  0.063*** 0.033  0.106***  0.116**  0.059***  0.025 0.091*** 
  [12.00] [2.49]  [40.69]  [5.82] [7.99]  [0.92] [25.30] 
neg 
c  0.053* 0.114***  0.158***  0.204***  0.078** 0.138***  0.174*** 
  [3.45] [16.98]  [58.13]  [19.80]  [5.99]  [20.42] [64.79] 
neg – pos 
d  -0.010 0.081**  0.052*  0.088  0.019  0.113***  0.083*** 
  [0.08]  [4.86] [3.26]  [1.70] [0.24]  [6.82] [7.16] 
 
Notes: ***, **, and *  represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in 
parentheses. χ2 in brackets. All regressions include year dummies. 
a There are no hard pegs among industrial countries. 
b Refers to: ∆tt*pos + ∆tt*pos_1. 
c Refers to: ∆tt*neg + ∆tt*neg_1. 
d Refers to: ∆tt*pos+∆tt*pos_1 - ∆tt*neg - ∆tt*neg_1. 
 






Table 7. Asymmetry (FGLS) 




Pegged – Flex  Pegged – Nonpegged  Flex – Nonflex 












Obs. 1307  1723  1723 
 
Notes: ***, **, and *  represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. χ2 in brackets. All regressions include 
year dummies. 
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Appendix A. Description of the Data 
 
 
(a) Variables and Sources  
 
Variable Definitions  and  sources 
g  Rate of growth of real per capita GDP (Source: World Economic Outlook [WEO]) 
∆tt  
Change in terms of trade - exports as a capacity to import (constant LCU) (Source: 
World Development Indicators [WDI]; variable NY.EXP.CAPM.KN) 
civil unrest 
Index of civil liberties (measured on a 1 to 7 scale, with one corresponding to highest 
degree of freedom) (Source: Freedom in the World - Annual survey of freedom 
country ratings) 
gdpin  Initial per capita GDP (average over 1970-1973) (Source: WEO) 
gov  Growth of government consumption (Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
[IMF]) 
invgdp  Investment to GDP ratio (Source: IMF) 
openness  Openness, (ratio of [export + import]/2 to GDP) (Source: IMF). 
sec  Total gross enrollment ratio for secondary education (Source: Barro, 1991) 
latam  Dummy variable for Latin American countries 
safrica  Dummy variable for Sub-Saharan African countries 
trans  Dummy variable for Transition economies 
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(b) List of Countries (183-country sample; industrial countries in bold) 
 
Australia  Burkina Faso  Jamaica  Philippines 
Austria  Burundi Jordan  Poland 
Belgium  Cambodia Kazakhstan  Qatar 
Canada  Cameroon Kenya  Romania 
Denmark  Cape Verde  Kiribati  Russia 
Finland  Central African Rep.  Korea  Rwanda 
France  Colombia Kuwait  Samoa 
Germany  Comoros  Kyrgyz Republic  Sao Tome & Principe 
Greece  Congo, Dem. Rep. Of  Lao People's Dem.Rep  Saudi Arabia 
Iceland  Congo, Republic Of  Latvia  Senegal 
Ireland  Costa Rica  Lebanon  Seychelles 
Italy  Cote D Ivoire  Lesotho  Sierra Leone 
Japan  Croatia Liberia Singapore 
Netherlands  Cyprus Libya  Slovak  Republic 
New Zealand  Czech Republic  Lithuania  Slovenia 
Norway  Chad Luxembourg  Solomon  Islands 
Portugal  Chile Macedonia,  Fyr  Somalia 
San Marino  China,P.R.: Mainland  Madagascar  South Africa 
Spain  China,P.R.:Hong Kong  Malawi  Sri Lanka 
Sweden  Djibouti  Malaysia  St. Kitts And Nevis 
Switzerland  Dominica Maldives  St.  Lucia 
United Kingdom  Dominican Republic  Mali  St. Vincent & Grens. 
United States  Ecuador Malta  Sudan 
Afghanistan, I.S. Of  Egypt  Marshall Islands  Suriname 
Albania El  Salvador  Mauritania  Swaziland 
Algeria  Equatorial Guinea  Mauritius  Syrian Arab Republic 
Angola Estonia  Mexico  Tajikistan 
Antigua And Barbuda  Ethiopia  Micronesia, Fed.Sts.  Tanzania 
Argentina Fiji  Moldova  Thailand 
Armenia Gabon Mongolia  Togo 
Aruba Gambia,  The  Morocco  Tonga 
Azerbaijan  Georgia  Mozambique  Trinidad And Tobago 
Bahamas, The  Ghana  Myanmar  Tunisia 
Bahrain Grenada  Namibia  Turkey 
Bangladesh Guatemala  Nepal  Turkmenistan 
Barbados Guinea Netherlands  Antilles  Uganda 
Belarus Guinea-Bissau  Nicaragua  Ukraine 
Belize Guyana  Niger  United  Arab  Emirates 
Benin Haiti  Nigeria  Uruguay 
Bhutan Honduras  Oman  Vanuatu 
Bolivia  Hungary  Pakistan  Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
Bosnia And Herzegovina  India  Palau  Vietnam 
Botswana  Indonesia  Panama  Yemen, Republic Of 
Brazil  Iran, I.R. Of  Papua New Guinea  Zambia 
Brunei Darussalam  Iraq  Paraguay  Zimbabwe 
Bulgaria Israel  Peru   
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The de facto classification of exchange rate regimes used in this paper employ 
cluster analysis techniques to group countries according to the behavior of three variables 
related to exchange rate policy: (i) Exchange rate volatility (σe), measured as the average 
of the absolute monthly percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate relative to the 
relevant anchor currency (or basket of currencies, whenever the currency weights are 
disclosed) over the year; (ii) Volatility of exchange rate changes (σ∆e), measured as the 
standard deviation of the monthly percentage changes in the exchange rate; and (iii) 
Volatility of reserves (σr), measured as the average of the absolute monthly change in 
dollar denominated international reserves relative to the dollar value of the monetary base 
in the previous month. 
These variables are computed on an annual basis, so that each country-year 
observation represents a point in the (σe,  σ∆e,  σr) space. In this space, floats are 
associated with little intervention in the exchange rate market (low volatility of reserves) 
together with high volatility of exchange rates. Observations with little or no exchange 
rate volatility and substantial reserves volatility correspond to the group of fixes. Finally, 
intermediate regimes are associated with moderate to high volatility across all variables, 
reflecting exchange rate movements in spite of active intervention. Observations are 




                                                           
18 Based on Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002). 
19 Those that do not display significant variability in either dimension are judged “inconclusives,” and left 
unclassified. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Business School Working Papers 
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